Abstract
The issue of determinism and free will is one of the fundamental topics in Islamic theology, one of its most significant dimensions being the elucidation of the relationship between human agency and divine power and will. The proponents of determinism (Jabriyya), drawing upon the necessity of the occurrence of an act following the realization of power and motive, the impossibility of preference without a determining cause (tarjīḥ bi-lā murajjiḥ), and the exclusive attribution of creative agency to God, have challenged the reality of human agency and free will. In critiquing this position, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya employs transmitted evidence as well as rational, empirical, and innate arguments to defend the reality of human agency. Using an analytical-comparative method, the present study examines the arguments advanced by the determinists and Ibn Qayyim’s responses to them. The findings indicate that Ibn Qayyim regards human agency as genuinely effective in the realization of human actions, while not understanding it as implying independence in the creation of those actions. From his perspective, human power and will play a real role in the occurrence of an act; however, these powers and volitions, along with the other causes and means underlying the act, ultimately remain dependent upon divine creatorship and will. He also distinguishes between the necessity of an act’s occurrence once its causes and means have been realized and the meaning of coercive determinism (jabr). Through this distinction, he challenges the determinists’ argument for denying human free will. The overall result of this analysis is an account of human agency in which the genuine efficacy of human beings is affirmed while their independence from God is simultaneously denied.
Keywords: Determinism, Free Will, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Jabriyya, Human Agency, Power and Will.